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CALIFORNIA'S DORMANT HEARSAY
EXCEPTION: SECTION 1200(b) OF THE
EVIDENCE CODE
Kandis Scott*
I. INTRODUCTION
The hearsay rule is intended to improve the accuracy of
fact finding by excluding unreliable evidence. Unfortunately
the rule has been so rigidly interpreted and applied as to ex-
clude truthful evidence and thereby cause injustice.1 To avoid
this result, courts and legislatures have proposed changes to
the rule and its application. Some advocate eliminating the
rule entirely;' others suggest giving the trial judge the discre-
tion to admit hearsay on an ad hoc basis.3 California chose to
preserve the hearsay rule with its established exceptions, but
also specifically invited the creation of additional exceptions.
That alternative to a rigid hearsay rule was codified in 1965
because it was "calculated to encourage growth and develop-
ment in this area of the law, while conserving the values and
experiences of the past as a guide to the future."4
California Evidence Code section 1200(b) excludes hear-
say evidence unless it falls within exceptions provided by law.'
0 1983 by Kandis Scott
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1. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1427 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
2. The Uniform Rules of Evidence admit hearsay statements of witnesses avail-
able for cross-examination. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953). The Model Code of Evidence
admits the hearsay of available and unavailable witnesses. MODEL CODE OP EvID.
RuLE 503. These dramatic proposals would be limited in criminal cases by the guar-
antee of confrontation in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.
3. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966);
FED. R. EvID. 403 (giving court discretion to exclude evidence of questionable proba-
tive value).
4. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee notes.
5. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1200, 1220-1341 (West 1966). Section 1200 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) "Hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated.
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The opportunity for growth and development is found in the
definition of "law" which includes "constitutional, statutory,
and decisional law."' In this way the legislature encouraged
the courts to continue the common law development of excep-
tions to the hearsay rule.7 Unfortunately, the courts have al-
lowed this authority to lie dormant leaving the codifiers'
promise of flexibility unfulfilled.
This article explains California Evidence Code section
1200(b) and suggests that the courts create new exceptions for
trustworthy and necessary hearsay evidence. It goes on to crit-
icize the hearsay exceptions for fresh complaints and invoices
which could be more carefully designed if adopted openly
under section 1200(b). Finally it proposes new exceptions and
encourages judicial development of the hearsay rule.
II. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1200(B)
The history of Evidence Code section 1200(b) shows the
intent to authorize courts to create new exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Initially the California Law Revision Commis-
sion followed the Uniform Rules of Evidence and limited ex-
ceptions to those enumerated in the proposed evidence code.'
In July 1964 however, the Commission reversed itself and per-
mitted the judiciary to continue developing new exceptions to
the hearsay rule. Although the reasoning of the Commission
(b) Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 (West 1966).
6. CAL. EvID. CODE § 160 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
7. In People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964),
the California Supreme Court held that an exception for declarations against penal
interest existed despite the fact that it was not mentioned in the California evidence
codification of 1872. The statutes did not freeze the law of evidence. Spriggs is cited
with approval in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Comment to California Evi-
dence Code § 1200. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 legislative committee comment (Deering
1966).
8. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study relating to The Uniform Rules
of Evidence, 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 311, 339, 341 (1963) (recommending
adoption of UNIF. R. EvID. 63, 32 & 66.1 (1954)).
9. The New Jersey Supreme Court proposal which inspired this change made
hearsay inadmissible "except as permitted by rule of law established by statute or
decision or by exceptions provided [in the Evidence Rules]." California Law Revision
Comm'n Minutes, Memo 64-49, at 2 (July 1964) (emphasis added) (unpublished
memo in the offices of the Commission). The Commission also agreed to change the
comment to the new statute, to read: "Under Section 1200, exceptions to the hearsay
rule may be found either in statutes or in decisional law." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200
legislative committee comment (Deering 1966) (emphasis added).
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in making this change has not been preserved, the Commis-
sion's final recommendation favors the inclusion of court-
made exceptions:
The Code will not, however, stifle all court development
of the law of evidence .... [T]he Evidence Code is de-
liberately framed to permit the courts to work out partic-
ular problems or to extend declared principles into new
areas of the law. As a general rule, the code permits the
courts to work toward greater admissibility of evidence
but does not permit the courts to develop additional ex-
clusionary rules."0
Thus California courts can declare new exceptions to the
hearsay rule under section 1200(b) without straining to extend
the old exceptions.
Section 1200(b) does not tell the courts how to decide
which hearsay to admit. The most reasonable way to decide
would be to use the traditional standard which permits excep-
tions to the hearsay rule for evidence that is trustworthy and
necessary." Turning first to the necessity test, one finds it is a
trivial barrier to admission of hearsay. Most new exceptions
would meet the minimal standard of necessity now used. Ne-
cessity means "practically convenient."1 2 The necessity test,
as interpreted in other jurisdictions, demands only a showing
that the same quality evidence is not available."3
In August, 1964 the Commission formally adopted the New Jersey phrase "ex-
cept as provided by rule of law." The matter arose for a third time at the September,
1964 meeting when the Commission reconsidered and found that there were not
enough votes to change the policy of permitting courts to fashion new hearsay excep-
tions. California Law Revision Comm'n Minutes, Memo 64-66, at 1 (September 1964)(unpublished memo in the offices of the Commission).
10. Recommendation of Law Revision Comm'n Proposing An Evidence Code, 7
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 34 (1965) (emphasis in original).
11. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 1420, 1422; C. McCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 305 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK
(1954)].
This two-part test, slightly modified, is the standard used by the federal courts in
applying the "catchall exception." FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
12. See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 632
(5th Cir. 1969).
13. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1421. In federal court hearsay is necessary
if it is more probative than other evidence which can be procured through reasonable
efforts. FED. R. EvID. §§ 803(24), 804(b)(5). United States v. American Cyanamid, 427
F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (unnecessarily expensive and time consuming to call
witnesses); United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 540
F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (most powerful evidence to
resolve conflict); Ark-Mo Farms v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. CI. 1976) (to call
19831
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California does not require even that minimal showing of
necessity to create a new hearsay exception,"' but it may go
too far. Parties pressing for new exceptions will argue that the
existing rules inhibit their ability to prove their cases. In any
event when a court is asked to define a new hearsay exception,
as it would under section 1200(b), it should consciously ex-
amine the need for such evidence.
As to the meaning of trustworthiness, California courts
can find guidance in the common law and the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Under common law hearsay is trustworthy if it
does not present all four hearsay dangers: misperception,
failed memory, ambiguity or misstatement by the declarant,
and insincerity. The presence of these dangers and counsel's
inability to adequately cross-examine an out-of-court declar-
ant produce a risk of inaccuracy so great that the evidence is
excluded."5 When some of these dangers are absent, the use-
fulness of the evidence exceeds its potential unreliability and
the hearsay will be admitted as an exception.'3
Hearsay is also trustworthy if the circumstances sur-
witnesses would unnecessarily prolong trial); cf. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d
294 (5th Cir. 1977) (that available witness is frightened about testifying is insufficient
necessity).
14. People v. Brust, 47 Cal. 2d 776, 785, 306 P.2d 480 (1957). It may be that
either reliability or necessity would be sufficient to justify admission of hearsay evi-
dence. In People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964), the
California Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen hearsay evidence is admitted it is usu-
ally because it has a high degree of trustworthiness." Id. at 874, 389 P.2d at 381, 36
Cal. Rptr. at 845. The court went on to say, "[u]navailability provided a necessity for
the evidence, thus affording a basis for its admissibility in addition to the trustwor-
thy character of the declaration." Id. at 875, 389 P.2d at 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 845
(emphasis added). The court held that unavailability was not a condition to admis-
sion as a declaration against penal interest; the Legislature disagreed. CAL. EviD.
CODE § 1230 now requires unavailability. See also People v. Solcido, 246 Cal. App. 2d
450, 54 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1966).
15. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 334 (1977);
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1422.
16. This was exactly the approach taken by Judge Weinstein in admitting hear-
say evidence in United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). There a
barmaid could not identify the defendant as the person who had passed her counter-
feit money. The disputed hearsay evidence was the witness' assertive conduct of
pointing out the patron at the time of the crime to a police officer who was able to
identify the defendant in court. The court noted that the evidence was needed be-
cause there was no better evidence of identity available. The gesture was trustworthy
because it was made immediately after the counterfeit money was passed so there was
no danger of defective memory. Pointing is such a simple movement that there is
likely to be no error in communication. The barmaid, who had no motive to lie, testi-
fied and was subject to cross-examination.
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rounding its utterance assure its reliability.17 For example, in
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.," a fifty-
six-year-old newspaper was admitted because the circum-
stances of its writing guaranteed its accuracy. The reporter
had no motive to lie; in fact an error would cause him embar-
rassment or punishment, and would have been detected by
readers and corrected. The court admitted the newspaper in
evidence as a matter of judicial discretion.1
The final way to examine the trustworthiness of hearsay
is in the manner of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5) make hearsay evidence admissible if it
meets certain requirements and has circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness equal to those of the codified exceptions.'
The courts evaluate the proffered evidence by comparing it to
evidence admissible under one of the existing exceptions.21 Al-
though California and federal laws differ regarding new hear-
17. This approach, developed by Wigmore, differs only in form from the con-
ventional analysis. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1422.
18. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. Id. at 397.
20. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) excepts from the hearsay rule "A statement not spe-
cifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (i) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general purposes of these rules and the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(5) is identical except that is is applicable only when the hearsay de-
clarant is unavailable as a witness as defined in FED. R. Evm. 804(a). Both sections
require a party to give notice before using the exception. Notice is not required under
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b).
21. See United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
laconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th
Cir. 1976); Ark-Mo Farms v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976). An excellent
example of the catchall exception is Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1979). There, the widow of a truck driver brought a wrongful death action against a
truck manufacturer claiming that fire caused by a defective fuel system caused her
husband's death in a crash. The defendant offered a statement by the dead husband
made to a friend'and relative visiting him in the hospital two days after the crash
that his pants had been on fire and he had lost control of the truck while trying to
put out that fire. The court held the hearsay statement admissible if the declarant
had the mental capacity to make the statement. The court held that trustworthiness
of the statement is to be measured at the time the hearsay statement is made. Huff's
statement had several circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness: (1) it was volun-
tary and not in response to questions; (2) it was a statement of recent facts, not
opinion; (3) the declarant had no motive to lie, in fact the statement was against his
pecuniary interest in that it suggested that his error caused the accident; and (4) the
witness was a person with whom the driver would be open about this topic.
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say exceptions, the federal test of trustworthiness is useful be-
cause both schemes strive for flexibility...
California courts should create new hearsay exceptions
under Evidence Code section 1200(b) when hearsay evidence
is necessary and trustworthy. By ignoring the invitation of
section 1200(b) the courts have made the potential for growth
and flexibility of the hearsay doctrine more promise than real-
ity in California.
III. THE NEW CALIFORNIA EXCEPTIONS
Since 1967 California courts have created new hearsay ex-
ceptions only for the "fresh complaints" of sex crime victims
and for bills, invoices or statements of charges offered to
prove damages. In doing so the courts did not refer to section
1200(b) of the Evidence Code and failed to analyze the
problems in terms of necessity and trustworthiness. Conse-
quently courts and lawyers are faced with obscure reasoning
which weakens the precedential value of the cases. This article
will show that both exceptions, with small changes, can be
supported by clearer analysis.
A. Fresh Complaints
Fresh complaint is a term of art denoting an out-of-court
statement made by a sex crime victim2" traditionally admitted
in evidence on the issue of credibility only.2 4 The classic ex-
ample of a fresh complaint is a rape victim's report of the as-
sault to her family after she has composed herself. The state-
ment may be addressed to anyone and need not be made
22. J. Friedenthal, Analysis of Differences Between the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and the California Evidence Code, prepared for the California Law Revision
Commission 46 (January, 1976). Section 1200(b) anticipates courts' excepting a cate-
gory or class of evidence from the hearsay rule. In contrast, the federal rules give trial
courts discretion to admit hearsay ad hoc. This difference does not make the federal
test for reliability inapplicable.
23. Hereinafter victims are referred to as female and assailants/defendants as
male for convenience and brevity despite the fact that this is not always accurate.
Traditionally rape victims have been female and that fact makes this sexual identifi-
cation a bit more natural.
24. McCoRMICK (1954), supra note 11, at § 49 n.27; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
at § 1134. In England and Canada fresh complaints fall within the res gestae excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1760. Some United States
jurisdictions admit fresh complaints as res gestae or spontaneous declarations. Id. at
§ 1761; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1139.
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while the speaker is upset and excited so long as it is spoken
reasonably soon after the crime. Originally only statements
made by rape victims were characterized as fresh com-
plaints.2 Now however, the fresh complaint doctrine also in-
cludes statements made by children who are sexually abused 6
and nonvictims.2 7 California has enlarged the fresh complaint
doctrine dramatically: fresh complaints may be used as sub-
stantive evidence.
In its traditional use a fresh complaint tends to support
credibility either as a prior consistent statement 28 or as an ex-
planation of an inferred inconsistency.2 ' The absence of a
complaint where one would be expected creates an inference
which contradicts the victim's testimony that she had been at-
tacked. Proof that a complaint was made rebuts this infer-
ence. The classic statement of the rule in California is found
in People v. Burton:80 "It is natural to expect the victim of
such a crime would complain of it, and the prosecution can
show the fact of complaint to forestall the assumption that
none was made and that therefore the offense did not oc-
cur."'" This theory is applicable only if the complaining vic-
25. Historically the fresh complaint doctrine derived from the rule of "raising ahue and cry" which required a victim of a crime of violence to prove she raised a hue
and cry after the attack as an element of her case. See 6 J. WIOMORE, supra note 1, at§ 1760.
26. People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976); People v.
Butler, 249 Cal. App. 2d 799, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1967). See McCoRMIK (1954), supra
note 11, at § 49; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1134; B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA Evi-
DENCE § 543 (1966).
27. People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 68, 75, 81 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422 (1969).
28. In California a hearsay statement may be admitted as a prior consistent
statement only when the declarant is impeached in a manner which creates an infer-
ence of recent fabrication. CAL. EVID. CODE § 791 (West 1966). See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(B); 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1 at §§ 1135, 1138.
29. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1 at §§ 1137-1138. For example in People v. Al-faro, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414, 132 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1976), the court admitted a rape vic-
tim's statement to a doctor as a prior consistent statement, CAL. EvID. CODE § 791(West 1966), and on the alternate ground of "fresh complaint." 61 Cal. App. 3d at
428, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 364. Because prior consistent statements admitted to rehabili-
tate are admitted as substantive evidence in California, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1236 (West
1966), no limiting instruction would be appropriate. As an alternate ground, the fresh
complaint theory must have justified substantive use of the evidence. Thus, the fresh
complaint must have been an exception to the hearsay rule. Interestingly, the state-
ment to the doctor was made two to four hours after the victim's earlier statement to
the police-something less than the freshest complaint.
30. 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
31. Id. at 351, 359 P.2d at 443-44, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76; see People v. Belasco,
125 Cal. App. 3d 974, 178 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1981); People v. Brown, 35 Cal. App. 3d 317,
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tim testifies and makes her credibility an issue."2
Failing to distinguish the issues of credibility and sub-
stance, California courts have relied inappropriately on Peo-
ple v. Burton when admitting fresh complaints as substantive
evidence.3 3  Moreover, as hearsay exceptions,34  fresh com-
plaints are admissible even when the declarant is unavailable:
a situation in which the complaints lack effective guarantees
of trustworthiness. If the courts had created the new hearsay
exception directly, by evaluating the necessity and trustwor-
thiness of the evidence, the problem presented by the unavail-
able declarant would have been apparent.85 Even now under
110 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1973).
32. People v. Graham, 21 Cal. 261 (1862); MCCORMICK (1954), supra note 11, at
§ 297; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 1135-1136; B. WITKIN, supra note 26, at §
543.
33. People v. Panky, 82 Cal. App. 3d 772, 778-79, 147 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345 (1978);
People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 813, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583 (1976).
34. In People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976), the
defendant was charged with lewd conduct with his adopted daughters. The prosecu-
tion offered one victim's testimony describing one of several earlier uncharged lewd
acts to show the defendant's disposition and intent towards the victim. The victim
also testified that she had complained about this incident by telling her mother the
defendant was "bothering" her. The court found this admissible under the fresh com-
plaint exception. "Evidence of a complaint by a non-consenting victim of a sex of-
fense is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 813, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
683.
In People v. Panky, 82 Cal. App. 3d 772, 147 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1978), the court
admitted tape recordings of a victim's phone calls to the police reporting her rape
and identifying the assailant under the "[flresh complaint exception to the hearsay
rule." Id. at 778, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The victim's first phone call to police was
immediately after her rape and robbery. In her second call about 3 weeks later the
victim reported that she had seen the defendant on the street. The court admitted
the hearsay statements of the witness under three hearsay exceptions: fresh com-
plaints (citing Burton), spontaneous statements, and state of mind. The applicability
of the latter two exceptions is questionable.
Both Crume and Panky relied on Burton, though Burton found fresh complaints
admissible only as to credibility of the complaining witness.
Several other caes have admitted fresh complaints for the truth of their con-
tents without explicitly calling it an exception. By referring to the fresh complaint
rule and the spontaneous declaration exception as alternate grounds for admission,
these cases acknowledged the new exception implicitly. In People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 68, 81 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969), the husband's phone call to police after his wife
was raped in his presence was admitted. See People v. Butler, 249 Cal. App. 2d 799,
57 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1967).
In other cases, the record and the reasoning do not indicate the purpose for
which the fresh complaint was admitted. See In re Marianne R., 113 Cal. App. 3d
423, 169 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980); People v. Alfara, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414, 132 Cal. Rptr.
356 (1976); People v. Hernandez, 18 Cal. App. 3d 651, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1971).
35. The California Supreme Court has recognized there are problems with the
fresh complaint exception. On Oct. 15, 1980 the court ordered that People v. Akins,
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section 1200(b) the courts can fashion a sound hearsay excep-
tion for fresh complaints conditioned on availability of the
declarant.
1. Necessity for Fresh Complaints
Sex crimes often occur in private without witnesses other
than the assailant and the victim. Conviction or acquittal may
depend on the relative credibility of the accused and accuser.
The trier of fact needs evidence to corroborate either story."
The need is more dramatic in a case where the victim is a
child who is found incompetent to testify or unable to testify
fully. 87 Absent witnesses 8 or physical evidence8 fresh com-
plaints may be vital to the successful prosecution of a sex
crime. In these circumstances however, the impact of the evi-
dence may be so great that to admit it would violate the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. 0 Thus the
necessity for admitting a fresh complaint to prove the truth of
the matter asserted varies with the specific case; often when
the need is greatest, the hearsay is least reliable and the de-
fendant's right to confront the witness against him may com-
pel exclusion of the evidence.
2. Trustworthiness of Fresh Complaints
Even if needed, hearsay should also be trustworthy in
terms of the four hearsay dangers." The fresh complaint of an
adult or older child is likely to be clearly expressed and there-
fore presents little problem of ambiguity or mistransmission."
Small children, on the other hand, may speak baby-talk or
167 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980) (Dist. 2, Div. 1), not be published in the official reports. The
appellate court in Akins had extended the exception to include the complaint of a
physically abused child.
36. People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
"[T]he interests of justice were best served by introduction of the statements, since
the evidence was conflicting and . . . the jury could use all the help it could get."
United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. See People v. Figueroa, 134 Cal. 159, 66 P.2d 202 (1901); People v. Graham,
21 Cal. 261 (1862); People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978);
People v. Guiterez, 126 Cal. App. 526, 14 P.2d 838 (1932).
38. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 249 Cal. App. 2d 799, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1967).
39. See, e.g., People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978);
see also People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 238, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
42. Contra People v. Alfaro, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414, 132 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1976).
1983]
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lack the vocabulary to accurately describe an event.43 A family
member usually hears the child's first complaint and is most
likely to understand the child's personal vocabulary which di-
minishes the danger of mistransmission."
Inaccuracies attributable to faded memories also do not
present a problem because fresh complaints must be timely.5
Although exciting events are often misperceived,6 the actions
constituting a sex crime should be sufficiently clear. The iden-
tification of the assailant is less likely to be accurate but does
not present dangers of misperception greater than those found
in other examples of in-court and out-of-court statements. 7
The danger that the complaint was fabricated is not
troublesome where the witness is available. s If the declarant
testifies to having made the statement and that it was true,
she in effect adopts the statement and no serious hearsay
problems arise.4 9 The opportunity to cross-examine her fur-
43. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978) ("pee-pee
in my bummy"); People v. Brown, 35 Cal. App. 3d 317, 110 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1973)
(sodomy different than rape). If the victim is unable to describe the incident, there is
no complaint.
44. If a child describes sexual abuse in accurate terms, there is no danger of
mistransmission. However, one asks how a child acquired such a vocabulary and
whether the witness distorted the declarant's report. See People v. Crume, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976). In Crume the thirteen year old witness testi-
fied that the defendant "[t]ried to make me copulate his penis. ... Id. at 813, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 583. The witness was attempting to describe not an act of sexual inter-
course, but an act of oral intercourse. The witness probably acquired the term "copu-
lation" from "oral copulation" as used in the statute, see CAL. PENAL CODE §
288a(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982), and as used by police and court officials.
45. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 35 Cal. App. 3d 296, 167 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1973).
46. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURO, supra note 15, at 389-400.
47. A characterization of ambiguous acts and an identification made after a
brief glimpse under the worst conditions by a minor incompetent to testify would
lack sufficient trustworthiness. The trial court's discretion to exclude confusing and
misleading evidence is a necessary guarantee of reliability in such circumstances. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966); FED. R. EVID. 401.
48. Fabrication is not a problem when the victim testifies and can be cross-
examined. If one considers the difficulties of an advocate in this area, cross-examina-
tion may not be such an effective device. Defense counsel is limited not only by rules,
but by the negative effect harsh examination of a sympathetic witness would have on
the jury. This problem has grown since concern for rape victims has heightened. But
see CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b)(4) (West Supp. 1981); see FED. R. EvID. 412. On
the other hand, children are easy witnesses to lead.
49. UNir. R. OF EviD. 63(1)(1953); see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) advisory commit-
tee note (d)(1); 2 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 8:1 (6th ed. 1972). The fresh com-
plaint rule applies when the out-of-court declarant testifies consistently with her out-
of-court statement. If the testimony were inconsistent with the earlier complaint, the
prosecution would offer the complaint as a prior inconsistent statement which is ad-
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ther diminishes the chance that the jury will be mislead by an
insincere complaint.' 0
When the declarant is unavailable, such as a child found
incompetent to testify,"1 the danger of fabrication is more sig-
nificant. A young child who does not understand sexual be-
havior or appreciate that certain behavior is socially wrong
would probably complain only because of pain or fear, not be-
cause he or she has learned that complaining or accusing is
appropriate behavior." On the other hand the small child may
not be that naive and it may be difficult to determine whether
the complaint is make-believe or exaggerated.'3 Children may
lie and change their stories to avoid possible punishment.
One common defense tactic is to claim the child is fabricating
in retaliation against. a strict parent." On balance a fresh
complaint is trustworthy in terms of the "hearsay dangers"
only when the declarant testifies.
In deciding whether fresh complaints should be admissi-
ble as a hearsay exception under section 1200(b), one may also
compare the complaint's reliability to that of the established
exceptions. Because fresh complaints have been admissible
traditionally as a means of bolstering a victim witness' credi-
bility, they are most like other exceptions relevant to credibil-
ity: prior statements and identifications.' 6
missible substantively in California. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 law revision commission
comment (West 1966).
50. See CAL. Evw. CODE § 1235 law revision commission comment (West 1966).
51. People v. Graham, 21 Cal. 261 (1862).
52. People v. Figueroa, 134 Cal. 159, 66 P. 202 (1901).
53. Wigmore described the contradictory aspects of a child: "[O]n the one hand
the childish disposition to weave romances and to treat imagination for verity, and on
the other the rooted ingenuousness of children and their tendency to speak straight
forwardly what is in their minds.. . ." 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 509.
54. See, e.g., People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65(1961); In re Marianne R., 113 Cal. App. 3d 423, 169 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980); People v.
Alfaro, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414, 132 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1976); People v. Ewing, 71 Cal. App.
138, 234 P. 917 (1925).
55. People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976).
56. The fresh complaint exception is not comparable to the exceptions for ex-
cited utterances, FED. R. EVID. 803(2), CAL. Evm. CODE § 1238 (West 1966); present
sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(1), CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241 (West 1966); state-
ments for purpose of medical diagnosis, FED. R. Evm. 803(4), CAL. Evm. CODE §§
1250-1252 (West 1966); or declarations against interest, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3), CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966).
Although the modern doctrine of excited utterances or spontaneous declarations
does not impose a strict time requirement, immediacy is significant in that it makes it
more likely that the declarant is under stress. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory commit-
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Prior consistent statements and identifications amount to
adoptions of the out-of-court declaration in court and are ar-
guably not even hearsay. 7 Although not adopted by the wit-
ness, prior inconsistent statements may be cross-examined.5 8
The same analyses apply to fresh complaints. Another, more
realistic, justification for admitting prior statements is the in-
ability of a jury to obey an instruction limiting the use of the
evidence to the issue of credibility.' Jurors are especially
likely to use fresh complaints as substantive evidence because
they come in with the appearance of substantive evidence."0
Under Burton the prosecution may introduce evidence of
fresh complaint in its case-in-chief, despite the fact that it is
rebuttal evidence,' and the content, not the mere fact of com-
tee notes (1) and (2). A statement is rarely found spontaneous after a delay of weeks.
See United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975). A fresh complaint is admis-
sible despite the fact that the declarant has calmed down. People v. Burton, 55 Cal.
2d 328, 351, 359 P.2d 433, 444, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 76 (1961); People v. Hernandez, 18
Cal. App. 3d 651, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1971); People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 68, 81
Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969). Thus, unlike spontaneous declarations, fresh complaints do not
impose a serious requirement of spontaneity to assure trustworthiness.
Present sense impressions are reliable because the contemporaneity of event and
statement negate the likelihood of fabrication, FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory commit-
tee note (1) and (2). Fresh complaints, however, do not require contemporaneity.
Statements for purposes of medical treatment are reliable because the declarant
is motivated by self-interest to tell the truth. When making a fresh complaint, how-
ever, the declarant has no motive to be truthful about the cause of her condition. An
analogy to statements for purposes of medical treatment, therefore, fails.
Declarations against interest are admitted based on the assumption that one does
not speak against his or her own interest unless the statement is true. But this rea-
soning does not show that fresh complaints are trustworthy. It is unlikely that a vic-
tim would feel prohibiting embarrassment because attitudes towards public discus-
sion of sex have changed.
57. See supra note 49; FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
58. This is not without its difficulties and is not always effective. See R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 480-86.
59. "It is not realistic to expect a jury to understand that it cannot believe that
a witness was telling the truth on a former occasion even though it believes that the
same story given at the hearing is true." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1236, law revision com-
mission comment (West 1966).
60. For example in People v. Nash, 261 Cal. App. 216, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1968),
a rape victim, having just been assaulted, reports the rape to her mother in the pres-
ence of her grandmother. Later the victim describes the crime to the police. At trial
the victim testifies and is corroborated by all three witnesses' recounting the contents
of her fresh complaints. Clearly the prosecutor did not use three witnesses' repetition
of the victim's hearsay accusation just to rebut the possible jury assumption that the
victim did not report the rape. It would be impossible for the jury to disregard the
three witnesses' testimony when determining the issue of guilt.
61. This would seem to be a necessary rearrangement because silence creates
the impression of incredibility and therefore there is only the absence of evidence to
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plaint, is admissible. The content can include the nature of
the offense and the identity of the offender; further details are
excluded.2 Fresh complaints have guarantees of trustworthi-
ness equivalent to those for prior statements and for similar
reasons should be admitted for the truth of their contents."
Finally, the circumstances surrounding the declarant's
statement sometimes make the complaint as reliable as ex-
isting exceptions." A complaint made to a family member,
rape crisis center or police officer usually is made candidly to
the appropriate person." Another fact suggesting trustworthi-
ness is that complaining promptly is predictable or assumed
to be a natural reaction." Fresh complaints also may be cor-
roborated by physical evidence of injury, semen, or torn
clothes. 7 But not all circumstances tend to support the trust-
worthiness of the complaint. Many sexual assaults on small
children, such as lewd acts or oral copulation, may not cause
visible injury." Moreover, bruises and torn clothes do not nor-
mally corroborate an identification, a very significant aspect of
many fresh complaints. Finally a complaint may be an inten-
tional ploy to gain an advantage over the accused. On balance
rebut. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1135. Moreover, it would be misguided to
exclude this evidence because of formalities about order of proof alone.
62. People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 351, 359 P.2d 433, 444, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 76
(1961).
63. As noted, a fresh complaint exception is necessary only where the com-
plaints are consistent with trial testimony. See supra note 49. Prior consistent state-
ments are admissible for their substance only if made before an inconsistent state-
ment or before bias or motive arose. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1236, 791 (West 1966). Those
restrictions are inappropriate with the fresh complaint exception because the com-
plaints are now admissible on the issue of credibility without limitation and to im-
pose restrictions would extend the "pious fraud" of limiting instructions. See United
States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964). Fur-
thermore fresh complaints are rarely numerous because they must be made promptly.
Fresh complaints are most like prior identifications because they often contain identi-
fications and because freshness and availability are appropriate requirements of ad-
mission. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1966).
64. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1422; Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 286 F. 2d 388 (5th Cir. 1969).
65. Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286, 292-94 (7th Cir. 1979).
66. People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
67. Such corroboration enhances the reliability of the statement, but it dimin-
ishes the need for the statement. Wigmore recommends admission of fresh com-
plaints where there is other evidence of assault or nonconsent. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at § 1761.
68. See People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961);
People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 803, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1976); People v. Butler, 249
Cal. App. 2d 799, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1967).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the circumstances of the complaint do not present a strong
argument for trustworthiness of a complaint but may be deci-
sive in a specific case."
To summarize, fresh complaints should be admitted as
exceptions to the hearsay rule under section 1200(b). Al-
though not very necessary in the usual case in which the vic-
tim testifies, fresh complaints are trustworthy. Their admis-
sion does not present the four hearsay dangers except where
the declarant is unavailable. Fresh complaints are analogous
to prior statements admissible as exceptions to or exclusions
from the hearsay rule. Finally, the circumstantial guarantees
of reliability surrounding the making of a fresh complaint are
not strong, but they do not suggest unreliability.
In admitting the hearsay statements of the victims of sex
crimes70 for the truth of the facts asserted, California courts
have not confronted the problems presented when the declar-
ant is unavailable. The courts' inadequate rationale, however,
suggests that the limits of the exception are not settled. The
seriousness of sex crimes both dramatizes the need for all
available evidence and militates against admitting the evi-
dence where the declarant is unavailable and the dangers of
relying on hearsay are too great. The California courts still
have the opportunity to exercise their authority under Evi-
dence Code section 1200(b) and redesign the exception for
fresh complaints so that it is conditioned on the declarant's
availability at trial.
B. Invoices
California courts have carved out a hearsay exception for
invoices and repair or medical bills, admitting them as evi-
dence of damages to "corroborate" certain facts.7 ' For exam-
69. Other indicia of trustworthiness are that the complaints are based on per-
sonal knowledge, United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), and that the
complaints are statements of fact rather than opinion, Huff v. White Motor Co., 609
F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979). Neither is significant in itself.
70. Only once have the courts extended the doctrine to a non-victim witness.
See People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 68, 81 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969). The court of
appeal has attempted to extend the doctrine to a victim of non-sexual child abuse.
See People v. Akins, 167 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980) (California Supreme Court ordered
that the case not be published in the official reports, Oct. 15, 1980).
71. See B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 1.2 (1982). In Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage and Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P. 2d
641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968), the paid bill for repair to a steam turbine costing over
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ple an auto body shop repairs a dented fender and sends a bill
which states: "Removed dents from left front fender $150.00."
If offered in evidence the bill is a hearsay assertion that the
shop provided the specified services, that it charged $150.00,
and if the bill is marked "paid," that the charges were paid.
Besides these three obvious out-of-court assertions, the state-
ment implies that the services were necessary, i.e., the shop
did not remove dents from an undamaged fender, and, if
marked "paid," that the charges were reasonable.7 Therefore,
under common law, an automobile owner who sues claiming
that the defendant damaged the fender, must subpoena the
person who did the repairs to testify to the facts stated in the
bill or subpoena the custodian to qualify the bill as a business
record.7 ' This is no longer the only way to prove damages in
California.
The courts have created a hearsay exception for invoices
without referring to Evidence Code section 1200(b) and with-
out making the kind of analysis required under common law
or the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 4 Perhaps this is the reason
the new exception is unnecessarily restricted by the require-
ment that the bill corroborate other evidence.7 5 In other juris-
dictions invoices are admissible to prove their explicit and im-
plied assertions regardless of corroboration.6 The
$25,000 was inadmissible to prove that the repairs were made because no witness
corroborated that fact. An expert's testimony based on photos of the damaged tur-
bine which coincided with the repairs listed in the invoice did not satisfy the corrobo-
ration requirement. Only two other cases discuss this exception: Rodgers v. Kemper
Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975) (tort claim for injuries
arising out of an assault) and McAllister v. George, 73 Cal. App. 3d 258, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (1977). In McAllister, a dental bill had been excluded at trial. The appel-late court said that it should have been admitted despite a hearsay objection to cor-
roborate plaintiff's testimony, but its exclusion was not prejudicial. The itemized
statement of charges included work which was not necessitated by the defendant's
assault and which would be irrelevant in the action. Because the plaintiff did not
offer any evidence to show what part of the bill was attributable to the battery the
bill was inadmissible as irrelevant.
72. Id. at §§ 1, 4.
73. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1270-1272 (West 1966).
74. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d
33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
75. Judge Bernard Jefferson contends that corroboration is the guarantee of
trustworthiness which makes the bill admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
B. JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at § 1.3. However, the requirement of corroboration
makes the hearsay invoice unnecessary because testimony alone could prove all the
facts inferred from a statement of charges.
76. United States v. Ashley, 413 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1969); Hemminger v. Scott,
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requirement of authentication and the dictates of good advo-
cacy mean that the contents of an invoice will not be the only
evidence of damage usually. Moreover, the necessity and
trustworthiness of paid invoices are sufficient to justify their
unrestricted exception from the hearsay rule.
1. Necessity for invoices
While not absolutely necessary,7 a paid invoice is a rea-
sonable, practicable, and convenient way to prove damages.78
In criminal cases,79 where the large burden of proof encour-
ages the prosecution to produce the best possible evidence,
the convenience or necessity of invoices is realistically unim-
portant. The burden of proof on the prosecution 0 compels the
production of high quality evidence where possible."1 It is un-
likely that a good prosecutor would risk using a mere invoice
to prove a contested fact, such as the value of a stolen object.
A civil litigator, however, would use the documentary evidence
111 A.2d 619 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955); Wicks v. Cuned-Henneberry Co., 319 Il1. 344
(1925); Flynn v. Cusentino, 59 Ill. App. 3d 262, 375 N.E.2d 433 (1978); Smith v.
Champaign Urbana City Lines, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 2d 289, 252 N.E.2d 381, (1969); cf.
United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976) (corroboration of record custo-
dian is sufficient under federal rules where declarant is not present). See N. Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 4533-a (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-27, 9-19-
28 (Michie Supp. 1981).
77. Except in unusual cases, see, e.g., Hemminger v. Scott, 111 A.2d 619 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1955) (repairer beyond court's subpoena power), the repairer, doctor
or custodian of the records can be subpoenaed to testify to the facts contained in the
bill or about its preparation. Ordinarily invoices are admissible business records if the
proper foundation has been laid. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1270-1272 (West 1966).
78. "To (exclude paid bills] would unnecessarily inconvenience both the parties,
the court and the public by requiring doctors and other medical or hospital personnel
to leave their normal duties to testify to a matter which should otherwise go undis-
puted." Flynn v. Cusentino, 59 Ill. App. 3d 262, 375 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1978). See
Smith v. Champaign Urbana City Lines, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 2d 289, 252 N.E.2d 381
(1969).
79. Some crimes are defined in terms of dollar amounts, for example grand lar-
ceny and petty theft, or the penalties are adjusted according to the dollar amount
involved in the crime, as with vandalism. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West
1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(b) (West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
80. The prosecution must prove all elements of a crime by competent evidence.
Presumptions Affecting the Burden of Producing Evidence, 7 CAL. LAW REvISION
COMM'N REP. 14 (1965). But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
81. The prosecution may violate the sixth amendment Confrontation Clause if
it proves an element of the crime through hearsay evidence without attempting to
produce non-hearsay evidence on the subject. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); People v. Dickinson, 59 Cal. App. 3d 314, 130
Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976).
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when the damages are trivial and do not justify the expense of
an expert, as in a small "fender bender" case. 2 The bill would
also be offered as the only evidence of damages when inadver-
tence, error, or the vagaries of litigation leave no better proof.
In both the error and the disproportionate expense situations,
refusal to admit an invoice to show damages would produce a
result unfair to the proponent. A hearsay exception for paid
statements of charges thus provides a practical, convenient
means of proof and thereby furthers the interests of justice.
2. Trustworthiness of Invoices
Under all three measures of trustworthiness, invoices are
sufficiently reliable to be excepted from the hearsay rule. The
admission of receipted invoices on the issue of damages does
not present substantial hearsay dangers. An invoice is not
likely to be inaccurate because of mistransmission, mispercep-
tion, or failed memory. Good business practice compels accu-
rate record keeping by the creditor that is subject to correc-
tion by the debtor.
There is a possibility that the invoice will not be a truth-
ful statement of the goods or services provided, the amounts
charged or the fact of payment if there is collusion between
the provider of the goods or services and the litigant.83 Collu-
sion is unlikely however, because most people are truthful"
and businesses have a special self-interest in maintaining ac-
82. The New York statute admitting invoices as prima facie proof of damageslimits their dollar amount to $1000.00 in recognition of the problem of disproportion-
ate litigation expenses for a minor claim. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 4533-a (McKinney
Supp. 1981). Rhode Island imposes no dollar limit on admissible invoices and esti-
mates. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-27, 9-19-27.1, 9-19-28 (Supp. 1981).
83. The adversary system should prevent deceitful padding of bills. A litigant
may verify the accuracy of the bill before trial by deposition, physical inspection, or
by requiring multiple estimates. Where discovery is likely to be uneconomical, theinformal techniques of investigation and evaluation should suffice. Moreover, at trial
the opponent of the evidence can question the person who provided the services or
the proponent about collusion. Finally, the party opposing the invoice can call his orher own witness to contradict. "The repair shop was in that particular business and if
the defendant had any reason to suspect foul play in the transaction he had the op-portunity to come forward with evidence on the subject." Hemminger v. Scott, 111
A.2d 619, 620 (D.C. 1955). The cost of contesting the accuracy of a statement of
charges may make these suggestions merely theoretical.
84. R. LEMPERT & S. SALZBURG, supra note 15, at 47. See also Huff v. White
Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d1271 (5th Cir. 1977); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961).
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curate records and a reputation for honesty in the community.
Generally the person preparing the invoice is not under any
pressure from the litigant to make the hearsay statement (the
bill),s8 does not prepare the bill in a coercive atmosphere or
location, 6 and is not preparing it in response to leading ques-
tions.8 7 Cross-examination of the proponent of the invoice
should safeguard against falsification. Moreover, if the au-
thenticated invoice is suspicious, the court can exclude it be-
cause it presents a "substantial danger of misleading the
jury."' 8 Therefore, the risk of inaccuracy is not great when ad-
mitting receipted invoices.
One should also evaluate the trustworthiness of proffered
invoices by comparing them to evidence admitted under ex-
isting exceptions as is done under the federal rules. The busi-
ness records exception is most like the new exception. The ex-
ception for invoices is usually applied to a business record not
offered under the business records exception because the req-
uisite foundation was not laid by the "custodian or other
qualified witness." 9 Like other business records, invoices are
reliable because they are regularly prepared and systemati-
cally checked so that the preparers are habitually accurate.
These employees have the duty to prepare proper records and
are subject to discipline if they fail. The business must rely on
its own records and therefore is motivated to make them
reliable.90
Because the business records exception has been liberal-
ized in California and the federal system, the exception for
85. United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gon-
zalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979).
87. Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966); FED. R. Evm. 403; Hemminger v. Scott,
111 A.2d 619, 620 (D.C. 1955). The danger of fabrication alone, however, is insuffi-
cient to justify exclusion of the invoice.
89. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d
33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). See FED. R. EvID. 803(6); CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1271 (West 1966). An invoice for repairs or treatment must be prepared by a person
in that "business," and be prepared as a "regular practice." For example a repairer
who insisted on cash payments or a neighbor who repairs cars on weekends would not
qualify. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1271(a) (West 1966); see, e.g.,
United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
90. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee notes; E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 720 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCoR-
MICK (1972)].
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paid invoices departs from it only slightly. 'Recognizing the
slight difference, federal courts have admitted business docu-
ments under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) or 804(b)(5)
where the business records exception was inapplicable. 1 In
California the foundational requirements for the business re-
cord exception have been relaxed in a statutory procedure
permitting a business to comply by mail with a subpoena du-
ces tecum.9 2 No testimony is necessary if the records are ac-
companied by an affidavit alleging most of the foundational
facts for the business record exception. Lack of such a formal-
istic affidavit does not make an invoice so untrustworthy as tojustify its exclusion. Therefore, an invoice without corrobora-
tion is as trustworthy as a document admitted under the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule.9'
Finally, invoices are prepared under circumstances which
militate against unreliability.94 One special assurance of trust-
worthiness is that invoices falling within the new California
exception have been paid so the litigant acknowledged the
propriety of the bill and its assertions."
91. In United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976), delivery receipts
were admitted following a foundation which consisted of testimony by a witness who
was familiar with the delivery receipts, their use and preparation, but was not an
employee of the carrier who prepared the documents in the ordinary course of its
business. The receipts were admissible as business records and under the residual
exception for trustworthy hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 803(24). Karme v. Comm'r of Inter-
nal Revenue, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982) (foreign bank records lacking business
records foundation admitted under FED. R. EVID. 803(24)). See also Ark-Mo Farms v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Ashley v. United States, 413 F.2d 249(5th Cir. 1969)(decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules).
92. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1561 (West Supp. 1982). See, e.g., People v. Blagg, 267
Cal. App. 2d 598, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1968); B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 588 (2d
ed. 1966 & Supp. 1982); J. COTCHETT & F. HAIGHT, CALIFORNIA COURTROOM EVIDENCE
395 (1981). Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 1966) (custodian must testify to
satisfy business records exception) with § 1561 (West 1966) (duly authorized custo-
dian certifies by affidavit, need not testify); but see People v. Dickinson, 59 Cal. App.
3d 314, Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976) (dicta limiting admission of records by affidavit to civil
cases).
93. Invoices are as reliable as testimony based on writings. If the person who
provided the services testified about them, she would probably have to refresh her
memory by reviewing the records. See FED. R. EvID. 612; CAL. EVlD. CODE § 771 (West
1966). The testimony generated may be nothing more than a recital of the docu-
ment's contents. It denies the reality of trial to admit such oral testimony while ex-
cluding or restricting admission of the invoice. If the witness admits no memory of
the services, the past recollection recorded exception may apply. See FED. R. EvID.
803(5); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1237 (West 1966).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
95. Among the California cases, only in Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal.
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In addition to the three usual approaches to trustworthi-
ness, corroboration and authentication are relevant in assess-
ing the reliability of hearsay invoices.
Corroboration is the justification for the present Califor-
nia exception for bills. 6 Similarly, many federal cases admit-
ting evidence under the residual exceptions have stated that
corroboration is one reason for finding a hearsay statement re-
liable.9 7 Nonetheless, to admit hearsay because it is corrobo-
rated is not a good approach.as First, it is unusual. Few tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions are limited to situations in which
there is corroboration." In states which have permitted the
substantive use of invoices on the question of damages,
neither courts nor legislatures have required corroboration.100
Second, corroboration, unlike must circumstantial guarantees
of reliability, looks to information outside the hearsay declara-
tion and the situation in which it was made, recorded or
App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975), was the bill partially unpaid. In Lucas v.
Bowman Dairy Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 413, 200 N.E.2d 374 (1964), however, the court
accepted estimates noting that they were not as persuasive as receipted bills but were
sufficient when offered by a party with expertise in the repairs proposed.
A bill marked "paid" would be admissible as declaration against interest if the
person who sent the bill and marked it paid were unavailable. FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(3); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966). Acknowledging payment forecloses
collection and thus is against the provider's pecuniary interest. MCCORMICK (1972),
supra note 90, at 672. One assumes the person sending the bill would not make the
statement unless it were true.
Furthermore if an insurance company pays the bill, there is the additional pro-
tection of the company's internal policies intended to minimize unwarranted claims
and unjustified payments.
96. See supra note 75.
97. See e.g., United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979). But see United
States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978) (crucial hearsay excluded because inade-
quate guarantees of reliability and corroboration); United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d
1080 (5th Cir. 1977) (corroboration alone supported the decision to admit hearsay
statement of an unavailable witness).
98. An example of the peculiar results that arise from relying on corroboration
is found in United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976). One reason that the
court found hearsay to be reliable was the fact that three unavailable declarants told
similar stories out of court and thereby corroborated one another. In other words
hearsay is admitted on the grounds that it is similar to other hearsay, which itself is
admissible because it is substantially the same as the first.
99. Some hearsay exceptions do require corroboration. See FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(3) (declarations against interest in criminal cases); CAL. EvID. CODE § 411
(West 1966).
100. See supra note 76.
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remembered. 10 1 Therefore if corroboration is a test for admis-
sion of hearsay evidence, the trial judge must evaluate the
truth of the statement in ruling on admissibility - an inap-
propriate task.10 2 Finally, where there is corroboration there is
less need for hearsay. 05 The authentication requirements
make corroboration of invoices especially unnecessary. 14 For
example, to authenticate an invoice by content the proponent
would testify that a certain service was provided, that the
document was the bill received for that service and that he
paid the bill. 0 5 Although authentication does not always show
the reliability of an invoice,' it does expose suspicious cir-
cumstances to the judge who may exclude the evidence as
misleading.0 7 For this reason the authentication requirements
are strong support for an invoices hearsay exception.
Without reference to section 1200(b), the courts have
carved out a helpful exception to the hearsay rule for paid
101. United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v.
Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. The Seventh Circuit has held that looking for corroboration in deciding
whether a declaration fits under FED. R. EVID. 803(24) or 803(b)(5) violates the
equivalency standard (that the excepted statement must have equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness) set out in those rules because it asks the judge to
consider the probability that the statement is true. Huff v. White Motor Co., 609 F.2d
286, 292-94 (7th Cir. 1979).
103. We do not feel that the trustworthiness of a statement offered pur-
suant to the rule should be analyzed solely on the basis of the facts cor-
roborating the authenticity of the statement. Since the rule is designed
to come into play when there is a need for the evidence in order to as-
certain the truth in a case, it would make little sense for a judge, in
determining whether the hearsay is admissible, to examine only facts
corroborating the substance of the declaration. Such an analysis in effect
might increase the likelihood of admissibility when corroborating cir-
cumstances indicate a reduced need for the introduction of the hearsay
statement.
United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1979).
104. McAllister v. George, 73 Cal. App. 3d 258, 262, 140 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704-05
(1977), discusses the difference between an objection based on lack of foundation or
authentication and an objection based on hearsay.
Wigmore recommended that the hearsay rule be changed to permit the admis-
sion of an authenticated written statement without calling its author unless the court
thinks the statement so important that it calls the author for cross-examination on
request of the opponent. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1427.
105. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1421 (West 1966); FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(4). See also
McAllister v. George, 73 Cal. App. 3d 258, 263, 140 Cal. Rptr. 702, 705 (1977).
106. For example, a witness to the preparation of a hand-written bill cannot
help the court evaluate the accuracy of the contents of the bill. See FED. R. EvID.
901(b)(1), (2); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1413, 1415 (West 1966).
107. See FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
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invoices offered to prove damages. The use of these hearsay
bills in court does not present a real danger of failed memory,
misperception or ambiguous communication. The new excep-
tion is comparable in trustworthiness to that for business
records without formalistic foundational testimony or affida-
vit. There are also substantial circumstantial indicia of relia-
bility surrounding the preparation of the statement of
charges. The requirement that the bill be authenticated will
usually provide enough information to justify its exclusion if
it is suspect. Finally the dictates of good advocacy often as-
sure that a statement of charges is corroborated by other evi-
dence. Unfortunately, this exception is limited to use as cor-
roboration only. The courts, under section 1200(b), should
redefine the exception and permit unlimited admission of in-
voices to prove damages. 10 8
IV. FUTURE EXCEPTIONS
The California Evidence Code permits the courts to re-
solve specific problems and to work towards greater admissi-
bility of evidence. Despite the Code's promise of flexibility the
courts have failed to meet the need for further expansion of
the exception to the hearsay rule.
The courts, for example, should widen the exception for
contemporaneous statements. 10 9 This descendant of the non-
108. The California Evidence Benchbook supports the requirement of corrobo-
ration for the hearsay exception for invoices. B. JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at § 1.3. In
illustration five, a medical bill is said to be inadmissible where the litigant cannot
corroborate it because his injuries and treatment are beyond the realm of a lay per-
son's experience. Judge Jefferson insists that a qualified witness, here an expert, must
testify to the nature or extent of services rendered and that those services were neces-
sary as a result of the defendant's behavior.
Unless the bill itemizes damages causally linked to the defendant's behavior it
should be excluded as irrelevant but that does not mean there must be expert testi-
mony on the issue. McAllister v. George, 73 Cal. App. 3d 258, 140 Cal. Rptr. 702
(1977). In fact it will often be true that the person providing the services will have no
personal knowledge about what necessitated the treatment or repairs. If the custo-
dian of the records were called to lay a foundation, the invoice detailing technical
medical treatment or the business record, would be admissible without any testimony
about the nature of the services provided. The costly condition of expert testimony
should not be imposed on the new exception.
109. Section 1241 of the California Evidence Code provides: "Evidence of a
statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) Is offered
to explain, qualify, or make understandable conduct of the declarant; and (b) Was
made while the declarant was engaged in such conduct." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1241
(West 1966).
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hearsay "verbal act' 110 is restrictive because it limits the out-
of-court statements to explanations of the declarant's ambigu-
ous conduct' made while the declarant was engaged in the
conduct. 1 2 In contrast Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) ex-
cepts from the hearsay rule statements which describe or ex-
plain any event regardless of the actor or the time that the
statement is made."'
Several states have adopted the broader present sense im-
pression exception. 1 4 The fact that the statement must be
made close in time to an event inhibits intentional misrepre-
sentation and assures little loss of memory between the event
and the statement. If the witness made the hearsay declara-
tion she may be cross-examined; if another made the state-
ment, the witness will often have perceived the event and can
support the out-of-court statement by describing the event
and the circumstances of the statement.' 5 Furthermore be-
cause present sense impressions are not uttered under the
stress of an exciting event there is less danger of distorted
110. Mecchi v. Picchi, 245 Cal. App. 2d 470, 54 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); Wagner v.
Worrell, 76 Cal. App. 2d 172, 172 P.2d 751 (1946). California Evidence Code section
1241 applies to the words which accompany and clarify ambiguous conduct to show
its proper legal significance. Such words are usually analyzed as "verbal parts of an
act" and are not hearsay. See generally MCCORMICK (1972), supra note 90, at 589; R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 342-43. The Law Revision Commission
recognized this but proposed section 1241 to remove "any doubt that might otherwise
exist concerning the admissibility of such evidence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241, com-
ment assembly committee on Judiciary (West 1966).
111. People v. Marchialette, 45 Cal. App. 3d 980, 119 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975); B.
JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at § 13.2.
112. People v. Marchialette, 45 Cal. App. 3d 980, 119 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975). See
Mecchi v. Picchi, 245 Cal. App. 2d 470, 54 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); Wagner v. Worrell, 76
Cal. App. 2d 172, 172 P.2d 751 (1946); B. JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at § 13.2.
113. Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines a "present sense im-
pression [as a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." FED.
R. EvID. 803(1). Even a decedent's description of what was said at a meeting with his
insurance agent, made immediately after the meeting ended, was admissible as a pre-
sent sense impression under the federal rules. Wolfson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 455 F.
Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1978); accord, MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979) (23 minute delay
permissible). But cf. United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977) (admitted
under 804(b)(5) although appellate court approved of 803(1) exception also); S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 528 (2d ed. 1977).
114. State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979). J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 803-77 - 803-78 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
115. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory committee notes; MCCORMICK (1972), supra
note 90, at 710.
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perception or misspeaking."61 Precise contemporaneity is often
not possible and should not be required.' 17 The trial judge in
his or her discretion may exclude comments made too long
after an event to be reliable. Relying on section 1200(b) Cali-
fornia courts should admit hearsay under a new judicial ex-
ception comparable to the federal exception for present sense
impressions.
"Learned treatises" or publications made by a neutral
person are another hearsay exception in need of expansion
under section 1200(b). Presently, learned treatises are re-
stricted to proof of facts of "general notoriety and interest, '""'
adding little to the rules regarding judicial notice." 9 It would
be appropriate to create an exception for reliable published
matters so long as an expert is available to explain the test.'20
Treatises are trustworthy because they are written impartially
for professionals who will correct any inaccuracies. 12 1 There-
fore, the hearsay dangers are insignificant in comparison to
the strong likelihood of accuracy. 122 Furthermore technical
116. State v. Flesher, 286 N.W. 215 (Iowa 1979). Compare CAL. EVID. CODE §
1240 (West 1966) with 1241; compare FED. R. EVID. 803(2) with 803(1); MCCORMICK
(1972), supra note 90, at 709.
117. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee notes; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 114, at 803-32 - 803-33 (1979); see CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West
1966); FED. R. EvID. 403.
118. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341 (West 1966).
119. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1693 n.3. California courts must take
judicial notice of "facts and propositions of generalized knowledge that are so univer-
sally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 451(f) (West Supp. 1982). They may take judicial notice of facts of common knowl-
edge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court "capable of immediate and accu-
rate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 452(h) (West 1966). If a party gives adverse parties notice and furnishes
the court with information the court must take judicial notice of matters specified in
§ 452. CAL. EvID. CODE § 453 (West 1966). Thus, a learned treatise admissible under §
1341 is likely to be matter for compulsory judicial notice. Judicially noticed facts
must be accepted by the jury, CAL. EVID. CODE § 457 (West 1966), but the jury may
reject admissible hearsay.
120. The advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize
the danger that the jury will misunderstand the technical literature if not explained
by an expert. A new California exception could be conditioned on the availability of
an expert as is done in FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
121. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (reports prepared
for U.S. Dept. of Transportation on crashworthiness); FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory
committee notes; MCCORMICK (1972), supra note 90, at 743-45; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at § 1692.
122. See MCCORMICK (1972), supra note 90, at 743-45; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at § 1690.
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literature is often necessary or at least convenient 2 3 because
it obviates the need to produce costly experts. 2 " Under sec-
tion 1200(b) the California courts should admit learned trea-
tises to prove more than facts of general notoriety. 125
The most needed new exception to the hearsay rule in
California is a residual exception comparable to that in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.1 26 A new exception is needed to
permit trial courts to admit evidence on an ad hoc basis be-
cause section 1200(b) appears to authorize appellate courts to
carve out exceptions for classes or categories of evidence
only. 12 7 Ironically, certain code sections permit the discretion-
ary exclusion of evidenceH8 despite the policy favoring admis-
sibility,129 but there is no California authority to support dis-
cretionary admission. 80
A new catchall exception would not change the quantity
of the evidence admitted, but rather it would improve the
quality of analysis used. Trial courts now torture the existing
exceptions or use bad reasoning to admit hearsay in the inter-
est of justice. Appellate courts uphold these fair rulings on
equally unsatisfactory grounds which may ultimately lead to
bizarre interpretations of clear and useful statutory excep-
tions. Other times these courts add to the disarray by relying
on the doctrines of harmless error and judicial discretion to
sustain lower courts, rendering appellate decisions useless as
123. In Ark-Mo Farms v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976), hydrologi-
cal data contained in a government study was admitted over a hearsay objection de-
spite the fact that only one expert testified to the techniques used by the staff in
gathering data and making calculations. The court admitted the study under the
residual exception rule, FED. R. EvID. 803(24), by analogy to the shop book rule after
noting that it would unreasonably prolong the proceedings to bring all the staff to
court.
124. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1691; Friedenthal, supra note 22, at
69.
125. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 114, at 803-260 - 803-262.
126. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
127. See Friedenthral, supra note 22, at 46.
128. CAL. EvID. CODE 2 §§ 352, 1252, 1260, 1261, 1310 & 1311 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1982). Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1271, 1272, 1280 & 1323 (West 1966) (trustwor-
thiness as a condition of admissibility).
129. See supra text accompanying note 10.
130. Cf. Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which states "These rules
shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
FED. R. EvID. 102.
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precedents."' The effect of this practice may be the creation
of a catchall exception for discretionary admission of hearsay
without any reasoned justification for the new rule. A catchall
exception, modeled after the Federal Rules should improve
the quality of analysis.
First a new catchall exception should be defined in terms
of need and trustworthiness. This would create a basis for
trial courts' rulings which would enhance predictability and
clear records on appeal."3 2 Secondly the disadvantages of ad
hoc exceptions such as lack of predictability, unfair surprise,
and difficulty in trial preparation, may be remedied by impos-
ing a notice requirement like that in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence18 or liberally granting trial continuances. Ad hoc excep-
tions would also encourage in limine motions, thus
strengthening the pretrial hearing process. Finally trial judges
could admit specific reliable hearsay evidence when appropri-
ate in civil cases without weakening the guarantees of the con-
frontation clause in criminal cases.
People v. Nichols134 illustrates the usefulness of such an
exception. Nichols was prosecuted for felony murder arising
out of a fire which killed two children, ages two and five. On
the night of the fire, he twice called the Hutchins' home where
his estranged wife was staying and spoke with Mr. Hutchins.
That evening while the estranged wife, friends and the chil-
dren were at the house, there was a persistent ringing of the
front doorbell. The children looked through the window and
said that their step-father, Nichols, was at the door, but no
one answered the door. Shortly thereafter the fire broke out.
131. Except to some extent when constitutional values are implicated,
appellate courts will rarely reverse trial courts for mistaken rulings of
evidence law unless they have some reason to suspect the substantive
justice of the trial result. . . . Note the propensity of the courts to dis-
pose of evidence issues without discussion in a catchall paragraph, to
rationalize rulings below as correct, or to conclude, without reasons, that
possible errors below could not have affected the trial results.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 2.
132. The traditional requirement for a hearsay exception, that the statement be
necessary, is an appropriate restriction on the trial judge's discretion even if Califor-
nia has abandoned the restriction at the appellate level. The danger of a catchall
exception is unpredictability. Reining discretion in trial judges will diminish this dan-
ger. Moreover, need for the evidence is the most likely provocation for an ad hoc
exception. See supra notes 11-14.
133. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee notes; see FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
134. 3 Cal. 3d 150, 158, 474 P.2d 673, 678-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721, 726-27 (1970).
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The issue before the court was whether to admit the chil-
dren's identification of the defendant over a hearsay objec-
tion. The statement could not come in as a prior identification
because the children were unavailable to testify.135 The chil-
dren's statement was not a contemporaneous declaration be-
cause it did not explain their conduct. 36 The court admitted
the statement on redirect examination of the estranged wife
to rebut the inference of bias. 13 7
Instead of this strained reasoning, the court should have
utilized a catchall exception focusing on necessity and trust-
worthiness. The children were the only ones to see the defen-
dant, but their important statements were consistent with the
telephone calls and the known hostility between defendant
and his estranged wife. Moreover, the statements were made
at the moment the children saw the defendant and the chil-
dren had no motive to lie. However it was dark when the chil-
dren looked out, so they might not have seen the person at
the door clearly. The trial judge would have to decide after
careful examination of the adults who were in the house that
night whether the evidence would be sufficiently trustworthy
to go to the jury. If so, the evidence would be admitted in this
case without erosion of the principle which permits prior iden-
tification only when the out-of-court declarant is available for
cross-examination.
V. CONCLUSION
Without reference to section 1200(b) California courts
have created two hearsay exceptions since adoption of the Ev-
idence Code. The two new exceptions are not well designed:
fresh complaints should be admissible only when the out-of-
court declarant is available and invoices should come in re-
gardless of corroboration. Had the courts fashioned the excep-
tions openly as authorized by section 1200(b), these problems
would have been obvious and avoidable.
Rather than stretch the text of the existing hearsay ex-
ceptions, courts should admit hearsay if it is necessary and
135. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1966).
136. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241 (West 1966); see also United States v. Medico, 557
F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. Having heard the children's statements, the witness was said to have a
reasonable basis for her testimony.
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trustworthy. The trustworthiness of hearsay evidence may be
measured in terms of the circumstances surrounding its utter-
ance, the presence of the hearsay dangers, or its comparability
to existing exceptions. Following this approach, courts should
enlarge the exceptions for contemporaneous statements and
learned treatises and create a "catchall" exception giving trial
judges discretion to admit reliable evidence. By using the lit-
tle known section 1200(b) California courts could fulfill the
Evidence Code's promise of flexibility and substantive justice.
